

Introduction for the Modern History Workshop – September 2021

This text is the third chapter of the Ph.D. thesis provisionally entitled “The Filipino Revolution in Anglo-American Imperial Public Spheres, 1896–1902.” This dissertation examines the intellectual exchanges between British imperialist journalists from Hong Kong and Singapore and colonized Filipinos during the Revolution of 1896-1902. This underexplored cross-imperial contact reveals that British newspapermen helped Filipinos contradict the Civilizing Mission discourses spread in Great Britain and the U.S. British sympathizers propagated the revolutionaries’ propaganda to justify Filipinos deserved an advanced degree of self-government. This well-planned communication effort, named “Civilization Campaign,” consisted in spreading the image of a highly developed Filipino nation that had fought a successful and legitimate struggle of liberation following the rules of civilized warfare.

This British collaboration, however, did not result from these editor’s support of the archipelago’s complete independence, but from their strict defense of the British empire’s interests. These journalists aimed to guarantee that the U.S. recognized the Filipino government’s strength and included its leaders in creating a Protectorate designed after British governance models. The regional’s press adhesion to the British agenda also interrupted any support messages to the Filipinos when their resistance to U.S. occupation turned to guerrilla warfare similar to the Boer’s struggle against the British Army in South Africa. Still, this dissertation argues that this synergy was indispensable for Filipino voices to be heard, however faintly, in the U.S. press. In this way, the thesis reflects on the connections between colonial and metropolitan public spheres, anti-imperialist relationships, and the obstacles colonized people faced to represent themselves and their aspirations.

The following chapter’s goal is to explain how the Pacific English-language press studied received the Filipino Civilization Campaign during the Spanish-American War and the Peace negotiations. The text wants to demonstrate that regional newspapers adopted a distinctive attitude towards the Filipino Republic, different from the British metropolitan press. The causes were the editors’ familiarity with the Filipino struggle since the 1896-1897 revolution against Spain, their awareness of the Filipino control of the archipelago after the 1898 campaign, and their contact with revolutionary propagandists. On the one hand, that privileged situation made most of the press recognize some of the main ideas of the Filipino propaganda. On the other hand, some local journalists even joined the revolutionary communication efforts to demonstrate their right to a high level of self-government. These collaborators’ ultimate goal was to convince the U.S. to negotiate with Emilio Aguinaldo’s government the arrangement of a Protectorate modeled after Great Britain’s regimes in Egypt or the Straits Settlements.

[Do not cite or circulate without the permission of the author]

“This Part of the World Does Know:” the British Pacific Press’ reaction to the Spanish-American War

Laura Díaz-Esteve
laura.diaz@upf.edu

Universitat Pompeu Fabra (Barcelona)
Humanities Department / Research Group on Empires, Metropoles, and Extra-European Societies (GRIMSE)

As Chapter 2 proved, Britain’s Pacific press had been deeply interested in the Filipino Revolution. Given the abundant British commercial interests in the islands, newspapers closely monitored the conflict and encouraged Spain to reform its administration in the archipelago to avoid further turmoil. They rarely questioned, however, the empire’s ultimate triumph in crushing the rebellion. Contrarily, the consequences for the Philippines of the Spanish-American War that quickly followed were much more uncertain and could impact the Pacific’s geopolitical order significantly.

China’s 1895 defeat in the Sino-Japanese War marked the beginning of the scramble for influence in the country among different powers. Through loans to cover the war indemnity and railway and mining concessions, foreign countries aimed to strengthen their relation with the Qing dynasty. Such attempts from Japan, France, Russia and Germany threatened Britain’s dominion in the region, which aimed to protect its interests in China and other nearby parts of Asia, like Burma, Malaya, Thailand, North Borneo, and Japan.¹ Consequently, the future of the Philippine Islands became a primary geopolitical concern for all the nations competing in the area when the prospects of Spain’s permanence in the archipelago were severely damaged next to its Pacific Squadron in the Battle of Manila Bay, on May 1st, 1898.

The U.S. claimed to fight Spain to protect its national interests in Cuba while liberating the island’s subjects from tyranny and allegedly expanded the clash to the Pacific only to neutralize its enemy’s forces there. Therefore, there was no guarantee that the U.S. would replace the old ruler after expelling it of its Asian territories. Instead, that one of Britain’s rivals assumed the task and, along the way, undermined its control of the

¹ P. J Cain and A.G. Hopkins, *British Imperialism, 1688-2015* (New York: Routledge, 2016), 398–407.

region appeared as a real possibility.² As a result, the British empire observed with exceptional interest the evolution of the war and the terms of the Peace Treaty that decided the fate of the Philippines.³ This chapter studies how its Pacific-based press reacted to those events. In particular, it inquires how the Filipino Civilization Campaign presented in Chapter 1, which had already begun during the Filipino Revolution of 1896-1897, as seen in Chapter 2, shaped its response.

3.1 Choosing Empire: Great Britain and its Pacific Media side with the U.S.

Although the government officially adopted a neutral position during the whole conflict, in Great Britain, public opinion almost unanimously supported the U.S. action against Spain in the Caribbean and the Pacific and its expansion in both territories.⁴ According to Geoffrey Seed, such support was due to a combination of rational, emotional, and

² The literature about the international dimensions of the Spanish-American War is vast. For an overview of the interest its Pacific scenario raised, see: Rosario de la Torre del Río, “Filipinas y El Reparto de Extremo Oriente En La Crisis de 1898,” in *El Extremo Oriente Ibérico. Investigaciones Históricas: Metodología y Estudio de La Cuestión* (Madrid: Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional y Centro de Estudios Históricos del Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Históricas, 1989), 509–21; Nicholas Tarling, *Imperialism in Southeast Asia* (New York: Routledge, 2001), 143–49.

³ Although my focus is on British reactions, there is ample bibliography on other Powers’ press comments that testify how mediatic the war was. See, for example: Otto Van Den Muijzenberg, “The Philippine Revolution in The Netherlands and the Indies Press, 1896/97: A Study in ‘Localization,’” in *The Philippine Revolution and Beyond, Vol. 1*, ed. Elmer A. Ordoñez (Manila: Philippine Centennial Commission and the National Commission for Culture and the Arts, 1998), 383–407; Sylvia L Hilton and Steve J.S. Ickringill, eds., *European Perceptions of the Spanish-American War of 1898* (Bern. Switzerland: Peter Lang, 1999); Portia L. Reyes, “Eyes on a Prize: Colonial Fantasies, the German Self and Newspaper Accounts of the 1896 Philippine Revolution,” *Itinerario* 32, no. 2 (2008): 105–33; Paul J. Welch Behringer, “Images of Empire: Depictions of America in Late Imperial Russian Editorial Cartoons,” *Russian History* 45, no. 4 (2018): 279–318; José Girón Garrote, ed., *España y Estados Unidos En 1898: La Guerra a Través de La Prensa Europea* (Oviedo: Universidad de Oviedo, 2018); Jorge Bayona, “‘The Population Wants to Be Completely Free from the Spanish Yoke:’ A Case of Sephardic Jewish Anticolonial Solidarity from the Ottoman Empire during the Wars of Philippine Independence (1896-1899),” *World History Bulletin* XXXVII, no. 1 (2021): 13–16. [The bibliography on the American and Spanish media reactions are dealt in-depth in other sections of the dissertation]

⁴ R.G. Neale, *Britain and American Imperialism 1899-1900* (Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1965), 112. As M^aDolores Elizalde Pérez-Grueso points out, the first studies about British diplomacy during the Spanish-American War were mostly based on London press’ analysis. The support it showed for the American expansion was such that most historians argued Salisbury’s government was the instigator of McKinley’s decision to annex the islands. Later historiography, like Neal’s contributions, significantly nuanced the actual relations between both countries, but those early accounts serve as evidences of British public opinion’s clear support to the U.S. M^aDolores Elizalde Pérez-Grueso, “De Nación a Imperio: La Expansión de Los Estados Unidos Por El Pacífico Durante La Guerra Hispano-Norteamericana de 1898,” *Hispania* 56, no. 196 (1997): 556.

practical reasons.⁵ Among any other causes, British support came from a sense of racial affinity between both Atlantic sides of the Anglo-Saxon brotherhood, cemented by linguistic, historical, social, and cultural bonds. Many commentators defended that with such common heritage came a natural desire for expansion and compelled Americans to share with Great Britain the mission of uplifting savage races and granting that other powerful nations embraced “Anglo-Saxon senses of justice and honor.” Consequently, in much British press, Americans appeared as “fellow-labourers in the work of the better ordering of the world” rather than as colonial rivals.⁶

Secondly, the press considered expansion the natural evolution of American policy. They argued that the country’s history had demonstrated isolationism was only a phase, and growth beyond their current frontiers was necessary to solve existing social and economic problems and gaining international prestige and influence.⁷

Finally, observers also pointed out potential practical reasons to support the U.S. during the Spanish-American War. They hoped America’s new foreign policy departure would offer opportunities for mutual assistance of the two English-speaking powers. For example, the press implied they would collaborate to advance both countries’ expansionist policies and security against hostile states. Such cooperation was explicitly expected in China, where some British considered the U.S. a potential ally in defending the Open-Door Policy.⁸

⁵ Geoffrey Seed, “British Reactions to American Imperialism Reflected in Journals of Opinion 1898-1900,” *Political Science Quarterly* 73, no. 2 (1958): 254–72; “British Views of American Policy in the Philippines Reflected in Journals of Opinion, 1898-1907,” *Journal of American Studies* 2, no. 1 (1968): 49–64. For a more detailed account, see Iain Donald’s unpublished dissertation, whose analysis includes Scottish newspapers: “Scotland, Great Britain and the United States: Contrasting Perceptions of the Spanish-American War and American Imperialism, c. 1895-1902.” (University of Aberdeen, 1999).

⁶ Seed, “British Reactions to American Imperialism,” 260. Although this section analyzes the secondary bibliography that deals strictly with the media reaction to the Spanish-American War and the U.S. expansion, there is a vast bibliography on racial and ethnic identity basing what Bradford Perkins called the “Great Rapprochement” (*The Great Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1895-1914* (New York, 1968)). [I deal with it in previous parts of the dissertation but, just so the readers of the chapters know my references, texts on which I relied the most are Stuart Anderson, *Race and Rapprochement: Anglo-Saxonism and Anglo-American Relations, 1895-1904* (Rutherford, N.J: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1981); Paul Kramer, “Empires, Exceptions, and Anglo-Saxons: Race and Rule between the British and U.S. Empires, 1880-1910,” *The Journal of American History* 88, no. 4 (2002): 1315–53; Srdjan Vucetic, *The Anglosphere: A Genealogy of Racialized Identity in International Relations* (Stanford, California: Sstanford University Press, 2011). For a recent overview of this literature, see Clibe Webb, “More Colours than Red, White and Blue: Race, Ethnicity and Anglo-American Relations,” *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 18 (2020): 434–54 (see especially 443- 446).

⁷ Seed, “British Reactions to American Imperialism,” 256.

⁸ Seed, 265; Seed, “British Views of American Policy in the Philippines,” 28.

This last argument was especially relevant when discussing the specific matter of the future of the Philippines. With very few exceptions, newspapers regarded the prospect of establishing American sovereignty in the archipelago with sympathy. The press repeated the strategic advantages of the U.S. presence in the Pacific, like the need to prevent the aggrandizement of its rivals in the region. Popular support for annexation, however, was principally compelled on “grounds of moral duty” due to “remoteness of the archipelago and the supposed primitiveness of the Filipinos.” The expulsion of Spain had created a void of government and, according to Seed, “no one suggested that the possibility of a satisfactory Filipino administration was worth serious consideration.”⁹ As a result, Americans had to, citing Rudyard Kipling’s famous poem, “take up the White Man’s Burden” and civilize those less advanced peoples. Not only would they be much better administrators than the Spaniards but, due to their Anglo-Saxon heritage, using the *Spectator*’s words, would do it “so much better that any other power except ourselves.”¹⁰

The British media constantly referenced its own imperial experience, especially in India and Egypt, which entitled them to urge the U.S. to “model itself on the mother country.” Despite writers’ generalized confidence in America’s ultimate success in the Philippines, they expressed specific concerns about its prospective experience.¹¹ Knowing that their texts participated in a transatlantic dialogue and could be reprinted in North-American publications, as images 7 and 8 exemplify, some commentators offered constructive criticisms and advice about how to administer the islands.¹² They showed especial interest on two aspects: its relation to its inhabitants, and the Civil Structure they had to build.

⁹ Seed, “British Reactions to American Imperialism,” 261. For many more evidences of the British’s press opinions about the Filipinos, see Donald, “Scotland, Great Britain and the United States...,” 298–305.

¹⁰ Seed, “British Views of American Policy in the Philippines,” 50. For an analysis of Rudyard Kipling’s “The White Man’s Burden” representativeness of British public opinion on the Philippine Question, see Susan K. Harris, “Kipling’s ‘The White Man’s Burden’ and the British Newspaper Context, 1898–1899,” *Comparative American Studies An International Journal* 5, no. 3 (2007): 243–63; Susan K. Harris, “‘The White Man’s Burden,’ the Philippines, and the Anglo-American Alliance,” in *God’s Arbiters. Americans and the Philippines. 1898-1902* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 129–53.

¹¹ Harris explains these dialogues on the British trying to set an example in *Gods Arbiters*, 129–53.

¹² On the British and American media contacts of the period, see: Ellery Sedgwick, *The Atlantic Monthly, 1857-1909: Yankee Humanitarianism at High Tide and Ebb* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1994); Joel H. Wiener and Mark Hampton, *Anglo-American Media Interactions, 1850-2000* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2007); Joel H. Wiener, *The Americanization of the British Press, 1830s-1914. Speed in the Age of Transatlantic Journalism* (Basingstoke, Hampshire, New York: Palgrave, 2011).



Image 7. “After many years” shows Columbia and Britannia shaking hands in the context of the “Eastern Question” and the “Spanish-American War”, illustrating the mentioned perception that both conflicts reunited both Anglo-Saxon countries for common interests. (Cartoon by Louis Dalrymple. Keppler & Schwarzmann, June 15, 1898. Photo Courtesy of the Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division: www.loc.gov/item/2012647573/).¹³

¹³ For more examples of illustrations transmitting the same ideas, see Abe Ignacio et al., *The Forbidden Book. The Philippine-American War in Political Cartoons* (San Francisco: T’Boli Publishing and Distribution, 2004). For a recent critical analysis of these illustrations’ message and their evolution, see Stephen Tuffnell, “‘The International Siamese Twins’. The Iconography of Anglo-American Inter-Imperialism,” in *Comic Empires: Imperialism in Cartoons, Caricature, and Satirical Art*, ed. Richard Scully and Andrekos Varnava (Manchester University Press, 2019), 92–133.



Image 8. “The White Man’s Burden” portrays John Bull leading Uncle Sam in their shared mission of “uplifting savage peoples” towards civilization (Cartoon by Victor Gillam. *Judge*, April 1, 1899. Photo courtesy of the Ohio State University, Billy Ireland Cartoon Library and Museum: www.library.osu.edu/dc/concern/generic_works/g732tk384#?c=0&m=0&s=0&cv=0&xywh=-1962%2C-43%2C7523%2C2624=

On the one hand, they exhorted the U.S. to reproduce their “principled imperialism,” “committed to interventions that would benefit both the home country and the colonial themselves.”¹⁴ Although the colonized would end up benefiting from that rule, they could initially present resistance and hostility. Therefore, North Americans had to adopt a paternalistic and strong attitude, and clarify that self-government was not a possibility any time near. Along this line, according to Seed, one of the abundant examples of the orthodox view of the “unfitness” of the Philippines’ inhabitants for the systems of government appropriate to the Anglo-Saxon nations were warnings that the American government was insufficiently appreciative “of the difference in governmental mental aptitude between the Filipinos and the people of the United States.” During the following years, they blamed many of the colony’s problems on the “ridiculous” and “dangerous” assumption that its citizens were fitted for democratic government and the consequent attempts to make them participate in that rule.¹⁵

On the other hand, they debated about whether Americans would make the most of that new colonial adventure, which could be not only convenient for the colonized, but also “purifying for the colonizers.”¹⁶ To establish a strong, stable, honest, transparent, and uncorrupted structure to handle the colonies, British observers cautioned that the U.S. needed to improve its domestic governance by addressing endemic problems of its political culture, like nepotism and corruption. To achieve it, some British commentators suggested different solutions, like establishing a tradition “that saw training sons for service to the state as an honor” or offering good salaries for the members of the Civil Services.¹⁷

As years went by and British designs for the American Philippines didn’t materialize, its press’ interest declined and excitement turned into outspoken disillusionment.¹⁸ We can conclude, however, that during 1898 the support for the American cause was almost unanimous in Great Britain.

¹⁴ Susan Harris, *God’s Arbiters*, 132. Harris, 132.

¹⁵ Seed, “British Views of American Policy in the Philippines,” 52.

¹⁶ Harris, “‘The White Man’s Burden’ and the British Newspaper Context,” 258.

¹⁷ Harris, 257. Also Kramer, “Empires, Exceptions, and Anglo-Saxons: Race and Rule between the British and U.S. Empires, 1880-1910,” 1347–52.

¹⁸ Seed, “British Views of American Policy in the Philippines,” 60-64; Kramer, “Empires, Exceptions, and Anglo-Saxons,” 1344-1348; Donald, “Scotland, Great Britain and the United States...,” 320–334

Like in London, the press based in Hong Kong and Singapore indisputably sided with the U.S. from the first moment a confrontation with Spain appeared as a possibility.¹⁹ Although these newspapers had informed about the tension between the two countries since much earlier, it naturally received the utmost attention during the weeks leading to the declaration of war, on April 25, 1898.

In almost all the editorials and chronicles about the disputes leading to the war, and during the conflict itself, the analyzed press depicted Spain as a decrepit empire condemned to perish. Following the arguments some of them had exposed during the first phase of the Filipino Revolution, they criticized its attitudes and morals, its colonial maladministration, and its abuses upon the local population.²⁰ Even the *Hong Kong Telegraph*, who had defended the continuity of the old administration in the archipelago during the previous years, supported its defeat when challenged by the United States. As soon as April 9, it compared Spain with Don Quixote, “a nobly-born, high spirit, lovable man, with the instincts of a gentleman, the delicacy of a lady, and the pride of the devil himself.” The writer argued that “the proof of an administration is in its net results,” and added that “the net results of Spanish systems are discontent, poverty, rebellion, on every side.”²¹ Therefore, the system of colonial administration of this “old, shaky, blind, deaf, toothless, rheumatic, impoverished, threadbare and starving” man was an evil that needed to be removed.

Only a few observers manifested support to the continuation of the Spanish regime and defended it in the press. The most notable was the British merchant John Dill Ross, a frequent contributor to the *Singapore Free Press* based in Labuan, North Borneo. In a series of three articles and a letter to the editor published between July and August 1898, he defended that the Spaniards had “neglected their press quite as much as their artillery,” and he wished to complement the current one-side perception of a very intricate story by indicating the implications of Spain’s defeat to British interests.²²

¹⁹ The newspapers I analyze in the dissertation, which I present in its Introduction, are the *Hong Kong Telegraph*, the *China Mail*, the *Hong Daily Press*, and the *Singapore Free Press*.

²⁰ See, among others: “Spanish preparations for a fight,” *China Mail*, April 26, 1898, p. 3; “The Spanish-Governor General on the American People,” *China Mail*, April 27, 1898, p. 3; “How Spain exploits the Philippines,” *Hong Kong Daily Press*, May 14, 1898, p. 2; “Dulce est pro patria mori,” *Singapore Free Press*, May 3, 1898, p. 3.

²¹ Editorial, *Hong Kong Telegraph*, April 9, 1898, p. 2.

²² John Dill Ross, “The Future of the Philippines: From a British point of View”, To the Editor, *Free Press*, August 8, 1898, p. 2. Ross was a regular contributor to the *Free Press* and wrote different series of

Besides showing surprise to the Spanish military drawbacks and defending its Generals, “from whom I saw were keen intelligent men” and in command of troops that “looked efficient enough,” Ross defended that both under American or German influences, the Philippines would be placed under hostile tariffs. Not only “wherever the American goes his anti-British tariff follows him,” but he also reminded the excited pro-Americans the “threats, insults, and hostile legislation of so many years—from the days of the precious Alabama job, down to just before the outbreak of the present war.” Because of that, he warned that “time alone will prove the sincerity of the sudden friendship of Jonathan for John Bull,” and recommended caution.²³

As for the Filipinos, Ross alerted that Englishmen in the region considered them incapable of governing themselves even under an American protectorate and complained that “the bare idea of having the horrors of a South American republic enacted within twenty-four hours of the coast of British Borneo is intolerable.”²⁴ Along the same lines, and indicating the outreach of Filipino propaganda, in another of his texts he pointed out that the British residents in the Philippines, “and these gentlemen are surely in a position to say something on these matters,” distrusted Howard W. Bray, one of the *Comité Revolucionario Filipino*’s press representatives.²⁵

In addition, Ross commented that the accounts of the Spanish tortures and mistreatment of the population, especially by the *frailes*, were overdrawn. Repeating the praises to General Ramón Blanco’s policy that some Hong Kong press had written during the Revolution, he considered that had his “wise and human policy,” the Revolution would have died. Moreover, he added that the insurgents were now killing not only the *frailes* but also innocent women and children.²⁶

articles focused on Far Eastern Affairs, like a “Journey to Singapore” or “From Moscow to Vladivostok,” later re-edited in 1898 as a book under the title *The Capital of a Little Empire. A descriptive Study of a British Crown Colony in the Far East*, or “Of the pleasures of Pulp Papan”. His most famous work, however, is his two-volume *Sixty Years: Life and Adventure in the Far East* (1911). Other exceptional cases of support for the Spanish cause are: Veritas, “The Philippine Mining Co,” To the Editor, *Telegraph*, April 15, 1898, p. 3; “Admiral Montojo,” Correspondence, *Daily Press*, April 28, 1898, p. 2; “An Opinion on the Prospect of the Philippines,” *Daily Press* [Reprinted from the *China Gazette*], April 28, 1898, p. 2.

²³ Ross, “The Future of the Philippines.” Also Ross, “Las Islas Filipinas,” *Free Press* (Weekly), July 28, 1898, p. 4.

²⁴ Ross, “The Future of the Philippines.”

²⁵ Ross, “Las Islas Filipinas.”

²⁶ Ross, “The Future of the Philippines.”

For all of this, Ross concluded: “the best thing for the whole world is that the Philippines remain under the Spanish flag, with a reformed administration, under such guarantees as might be found practicable.”²⁷ This merchant had a deep knowledge of the country and close relations with its authorities and inhabitants. It seems safe to assume that the British residents skeptical about a potential Philippine Republic under American tutelage to whom he was referring belonged to the same group that, as indicated in the previous chapter, had supported the Spanish regime in the Philippines during the first phase of the Revolution and tried to ease the criticisms of the Hong Kong press. This evidence of a British community in Asia that sided with Spain finds support on interpretations like Nicholas Tarling’s, who stated that “the British would have accepted, even preferred, the status quo.” Only when the expulsion of the Spanish rule became evident, they decided that U.S. rule was preferable to German rule, as they dismissed the possibility of native independence and did not wish to intervene themselves unless such it was essential to defend her interests.²⁸ Because of all of this, it is pertinent to declare that probably more British shared John Dill Ross’ opinion, and that resigned support towards the United States could have been common.

Despite that, other considerations, like the early certainty that Spain would lose the war, made that such point of view was an exception in the studied press.²⁹ Although the examined newspapers recognized the historical links between Great Britain and the Spanish-ruled Philippines, they backed their “American Cousins.”³⁰ So open was their advocacy that the British consul in Manila warned their harsh criticism of the Spaniards put in danger their countrymen in the archipelago. He wrote in a letter: “there is a very bitter feeling against Great Britain having thrown in as it is supposed, her lot with the United States, and the Hong Kong press which comes over here and is translated into Spanish does not improve matters.”³¹

²⁷ Ross, “Las Islas Filipinas.”

²⁸ Tarling, *Imperialism in Southeast Asia*, 148.

²⁹ As examples of the confidence of an American Victory, see Editorial, *Daily Press*, March 3, 1898, p. 2; Editorial, *Telegraph*, April 13, 1898, p. 2; “President McKinley's Ultimatum,” *China Mail*, April 21, 1898, p. 3; “Cavite. A Reply to those who decry the American victory,” *Free Press*, May 12, 1898, p. 3.

³⁰ For examples of British support for the U.S., see: “Proclamation by the H.E. the Acting Governor,” *China Mail*, April 25, 1898, p. 3; “Excitement at Manila,” *China Mail*, April 26, 1898, p. 3; Editorial, *Daily Press*, April 28, 1898, p. 2; “Anglo-American Interests,” *Telegraph*, May 2, 1898, p.2; “Cavite (A reply to those who decry the American victory),” *Free Press*.

³¹ Nicholas Cushner, “British Consular Dispatches and the Philippine Independence Movement, 1872-1901,” *Philippine Studies* 16, no. 3 (1968): 524.

Their expressions of support often included references to the British and American shared Anglo-Saxon identity. They drew historical links in racial and cultural terms and implied future collaborations to achieve alleged shared goals. A clear example was the chronicle about the Battle of Cavite that Thomas H. Reid wrote for the *China Mail* and the *New York Herald*.³² His *laudatio* of Dewey's fleet, his unique show of Anglo-Saxon pride, and his use of yellow journalism techniques, such as graphic depictions and exaggerations, qualified him for working as a special correspondent of both the British press and publications from William R. Hearst's and Joseph Pulitzer's New York.³³

On Sunday, I witnessed the total eclipse, the annihilation of the Spanish squadron, the finishing touch by Commodore Dewey of the work begun by England upwards of 300 years ago, when the great Armada for the invasion of England was harried and destroyed by the wrath of God and the hand of man. There was something appropriate to the fact that one of the most effective ships in the United States squadron bore the name of *Raleigh*, one of the first founders of Great Britain's colonial empire, [...]: and however we may regret the decline and decay of a once powerful rival, the first great Colonizing Power of modern times, it is impossible to withhold our admiration for the splendid courage of our American cousins.- the pluck, dash and fighting powers of a youthful Republic, founded on the principles of liberty and equality, [...] and whose sons, a branch of the great Anglo-Saxon race speak the same language as ourselves - a nation "sib" to us in every respect, a nation with whom Great Britain might well cement a compact for the preservation of peace and the peaceful development of trade and commerce and all that makes for the enlightenment and happiness of the general community.³⁴

³² That allowed Reid to publish in his paper the long chronicles that the famous American journalist Joseph L. Stickney wrote on board of the *Olympia*, being one of the only three correspondents that witnessed all the battle of Cavite.

³³ This kind of exalted reporting complements the conclusions reached by Richard Fulton's study regarding the level of sensationalism and jingoism displayed by American and British journalists in Cuba during the Spanish-American War. According to Fulton, British journalists working for British media were much more moderate than American ones working for an American public. On this occasion, Reid is already writing with both audiences in mind. See Richard D. Fulton, "Sensational War Reporting and the Quality Press in Late Victorian Britain and America," in Joel Wiener (ed.), *Anglo-American Media Interactions, 1850-2000* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 11–31.

³⁴ "The Naval Engagement in Cavite Bay," *China Mail*, May 13, 1898, p. 3. For more examples, see Editorial, *Telegraph*, April 2, 1898, p. 2; An Unbiased Foreigner, "The Anglo-American Alliance," *China Mail*, May 3, 1898, p. 3.

In the rest of his chronicle, Reid kept celebrating how now that the U.S. had decided to assume its role in World Affairs, both sides of the Anglo-Saxon brotherhood would overcome their “petty points of difference” and work together.³⁵ As he made clear in the last sentences cited, such kinship would involve the spread of civilization and the defense of free trade (an apparent reference to the China Question).³⁶ Bearing in mind the British metropolitan press’s comments surrounding the Spanish-American War outbreak, texts like Thomas H. Reid’s one published in Hong Kong and Singapore allow us to conclude that both public spheres shared many ideas about the conflict.

Another clear example of those arguments appeared in an opinion article the *Singapore Free Press* reprinted on June 22 from the *Times of India*. It applauded the U.S. abandonment of the Monroe Doctrine and its jump to external action in the search for new markets, bearing the “burden of opening up new territories to Western commerce” and taking its place among “the great exporting countries of the world to which its position and its resources entitle it.” The writer celebrated that, as a consequence, “Great Britain would not be the solitary champion of free markets in the Chinese Empire” and, in a context where the future of the Philippines was still not defined, it stated that the United States would accept to fulfill his responsibilities towards them and rule the islands. To do it, they could look at the example of Great Britain, which ought to be “sufficient to assure American citizens that communities in an intermediate stage of political development can be included in an Empire, but excluded from the full stages of citizenship, without endangering the liberties of the people of the mother country.” Finally, it defended that after accepting those responsibilities, they would fulfill, in the Far East, “the requirements which its own interests press upon it, no less than upon the other great half of the Anglo-Saxon race.”³⁷

³⁵ Another text that talked about the anti-British feeling among significant parts of the population, especially in Irish-American and German-American communities is Unbiased Britisher, “The Anglo-American Alliance,” *China Mail*, May 5, 1898, p. 3. To learn more about it see Edward P. Crapol, *America for Americans: Economic Nationalism and Anglophobia in the Late Nineteenth Century* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1973) and Stephen Tuffnell, “‘Uncle Sam Is to Be Sacrificed’: Anglophobia in Late Nineteenth-Century Politics and Culture,” *American Nineteenth Century History* 12, no. 1 (2011): 77–99.

³⁶ For more examples of the confidence in the region’s press that U.S. expansion would bring commercial and strategical benefits, see: “The British Lien on the Philippines,” *China Mail*, April 21, 1898, p. 3; “The English Position in the Far East,” *Telegraph*, February 3, 1898, p. 3; Editorial, *Telegraph*, April 1, 1898, p. 2; Editorial, *Free Press*, August 22, 1898, p. 2. This latter was a direct reply to John Dill Ross’ arguments about a potential American restrictive tariff policy.

³⁷ “The Outward Movement of the United States,” *Free Press* [Reprinted from the *Times of India*], June 22, 1898, p. 3.

Interestingly, after reprinting the whole text, William St. Clair, editor of the *Free Press*, made a brief but eloquent correction. While expressing the impossible alternatives for the future of the Philippines, the author from the *Times of India* had stated that “neither by character nor by experience are the insurgent leaders fitted to control great island territories which have never known the advantages of enlightened rule.” He added that “to hand the Philippines over to General Aguinaldo and his associates would be to plunge them into a welter of semi-barbarism, besides which even the present political-ecclesiastical régime would shine by comparison.” As we have seen, that was the most common perception in the metropolitan press, shaped by a racial ideology that rationalized the Anglo-Saxon domination of other peoples. However, St. Clair added a discrete asterisk to the sentence to point out at the end of the article: “That is just nonsense.”³⁸ The following section explores how St. Clair and other newspapermen’s proximity to the conflict challenged the metropolitan perception of the Filipino revolutionaries.

3.2 The Filipino Civilization Campaign and their Observers

As seen in the previous chapters, during 1897, Filipinos had tried to justify their insurrection and highlight how they followed the rules of civilized warfare to fight Spain in the Hong Kong and Singapore press. During that first phase of the revolution, the media in both cities considered the Filipinos unprepared for self-government and dismissed the viability of a native republic even if Spain was defeated. Notwithstanding, the newspapers most sympathetic to their cause recognized the legitimacy of their demands and praised their organization and resistance facing the empire’s arms.

During the 1898 War, the same proximity to the theatre of operations and their connection to revolutionary propagandists also shaped the regional journals’ portrait of Filipinos. Although the Civilization Campaign earned drastically different levels of sympathy, all the papers analyzed acknowledged to some extent the Filipino nationalists’ power to influence the future of the archipelago. Some editors even reproduced many of the basic ideas of the Hong Kong Junta communication strategy. They challenged many prejudices about the indigenous’ savagery that appeared in the United Kingdom and the U.S. media.

³⁸ “The Outward Movement of the United States,” *Free Press*.

The *Singapore Free Press* was the newspaper Filipino voices impacted the most, just as it had been during the fall of 1897. When hostilities resumed at the eve of the Spanish-American War, instead of depicting it as a bilateral collision between a rising and a decaying empire, as much metropolitan press would do, the *Free Press* maintained Filipinos at the center of the conflict. Since its outbreak on April 25, until the fall of Manila, on August 13, it published news and chronicles that pointed at the locals leading role in fighting against Spain and to how they were the ones occupying most of the territory during the Americans' lengthy wait for reinforcements.³⁹ Exceptionally, it shared reports openly attributed to Filipino sources.⁴⁰ Also, Howard Bray kept signing opinion articles about the Spanish cruelties that legitimized the fight for liberation, similar to those seen in chapter 2.⁴¹ Finally, from that moment on, also the editor of the newspaper, William St. Clair, started publishing editorials praising the anti-colonial struggle and reproducing most of the impressions its leaders wanted to convey.⁴²

Among those texts, the most eloquent appeared on May 4 and narrated the controversial meeting where Emilio Aguinaldo and the American Consul Spencer Pratt had arranged their nations' collaboration. The article aimed to demonstrate two main ideas: first, that the revolutionary leaders had been fighting for the freedom and well-being of their people before the U.S. arrival; second, that the pact implied the recognition of Filipino independence under American guidance and protection.⁴³

³⁹ As examples of news that praise Filipino advances against Spain independently from the U.S. in the *Singapore Free Press*, see: "The Rebellion," Notes From the Philippines, April 27, 1898, p. 3; "The Destruction of Cebu. Massacre of Philipinos," April 29, 1898, p. 4; Howard Bray/Deus et Libertas, "Rumoured Philippino Rising at Ilo-Ilo," May 11, 1898, p. 3; The Philippine Rebellion, [based on an article from *La Oceanía*], April 30, 1898, p. 3; "British Subjects in Manila," May 3, 1898, p. 2 [in this text, they even recommended the British residents to go take refuge to the areas controlled by natives]; "Destruction of Spanish Squadron at Manila. The Spanish Flagship goes to the Bottom. The Americans Control Manila," May 6, 1898, p. 2; "The Insurgents in the Philippines," June 16, 1898, p. 3; "The following observations....," June 18, 1898, p. 2; "The Philippine Revolution," June 16, 1898, p. 2; "Fall of Manila at hand," June 18, 1898, p. 2; "Arrival of H.M.S. 'Linnet.' A Rebel Request for Arms," The War, June 24, 1898; "Aguinaldo's Action," August 1, 1898, p. 2; "Rebellion Spreading in Archipelago....," The Philippine Revolution, August 19, 1898, p. 2.

⁴⁰ "Forwarded to Consul-General Spencer Pratt by General Emilio Aguinaldo's Secretary", "The Philippine Successes Near Manila," June 15, 1898, p. 3 and "From a Philippino Source," May 9, 1898, p. 2.

⁴¹ For Howard Bray's texts in the *Singapore Free Press*, see "The Bombardment and Insurrection of Hong Kong," The Philippine Rebellion, May 3, 1898, p. 3; "The Rumoured Philippino Rising at Ilo-Ilo," May 11, 1898, p. 3; "Mr. H.W.Bray on the Future of the Philippines," June 25, 1898, p. 2

⁴² For St. Clair's editorials, see Editorial, April 25, p. 2; Editorial, May 3, 1898, p. 2; Editorial, May 9, 1898, p. 2; Editorial, May 13, 1898, p. 2.

⁴³ "Important Political Arrangement. Aguinaldo in Singapore", *Free Press*, May 4, 1898, p. 3. The *Daily Press* and the *China Mail* also reprinted the text.

To make his points, the author began detailing “the causes leading to the second appearance of the rebellion in the Philippines,” which “was almost coincident with, though not instigated by, the strained relations between Spain and the United States.” He argued that the rebellion of 1895-1897 had arrived at a dead point where none of the parties could finish it, so the Revolutionary Government signed the Pact of Biak-na-Bato and agreed to lay down arms and go into exile on condition of the introduction of reforms. Knowing that some observers had interpreted the payment of a sum of funds to the exiled leaders as bribery, he clarified that they “had lost all their property or had had it confiscated and plundered,” so “the Government agreed to provide them with funds to live in a becoming manner on foreign soil.”

However, the Spanish rule did not carry any of their promises. Strategically, to remark the lack of credibility they had, the writer referenced an episode from the Cuban rebellion, which was much well-known to international audiences than what had happened in the Philippines and had already raised their indignation. He described Biak-na-Bato as “another trick like that played on the Cubans after the peace of Canjun [Zanjón], arranged by Martinez Campos.” Because of this, remarking the high adhesion of the masses to the revolution, they retook arms against Spain, “not alone in the immediate districts round Manila but throughout the Archipelago, which merely awaits the signal from General Aguinaldo to rise *en masse*.” He would repeat that the President was only searching “protection to the people against the organized oppression and rapacity of the religious fraternities,” “improved civil and criminal procedure in courts,” and guarantee “in many ways improvements in the fiscal and social conditions of the people.”

It was then when Aguinaldo arrived incognito in Singapore with the purpose of consulting friends “about the state of affairs in the Islands generally” and about the possibility of war between the U.S. and Spain. Mainly, he wanted to inquire “whether in such an event the United States would eventually recognize the independence of the Philippines, provided he lent his cooperation to the Americans in the conquest of the country.” After days of conversations, Mr. Howard W. Bray “eventually arranged an interview” where Aguinaldo exposed the American authorities the “incident and objects of the late rebellion and the present disturbed state of the country.” Then, he proceeded “to detail the nature of the cooperation he could give” and declare what expected in return:

...he would guarantee to maintain order and discipline amongst the native troops [...] in the same humane way in which he had hitherto conducted the war, and prevent them from committing outrages on defenseless Spaniards beyond the inevitable in fair and honorable warfare. He further declared his ability to establish a proper and responsible government on liberal principles and would be willing to accept the same terms for the country as the United States intend to give to Cuba.

Therefore, after emphasizing important antecedents of the Filipino struggle, the text clarified that the policy Aguinaldo had drawn in his conversations with the Americans embraced “the independence of the Philippines, whose internal affairs would be controlled under European and American advisers.” Although he did not specify the time of that protectorate, the author of the text did state it should be temporary. In addition, while developing these two main ideas, the text repeated the selflessness of its leaders, their broad support around the islands, their efforts to fight a civilized war, and their aims to establish a liberal government that improved the well-being of the people. In short, in this text, and in many others, the *Singapore Free Press* reproduced the main arguments of the Filipino propagandists. Those arguments led the newspaper to conclude in another piece that with the “exemplar behavior demonstrated they could not be considered as rebels any more, but had now the rights and privileges of belligerents.”⁴⁴ The Great Powers could not pretend to sell them to the highest bidder.

Although it was more reserved, the *Hong Kong Daily Press* also transmitted many ideas Filipino propagandists tried to spread. In its July 1st editorial it recognized Aguinaldo’s advances and appreciated his efforts to maintain peace and stability in the territory under his control. It stated: “the insurgents being then in possession, and having achieved, as they considered, their independence are naturally reluctant to welcome a new set of masters.” They were daily “strengthening their position, both morally and materially,” and in Luzon, they had “brought their civil and military organization to its present state of perfection with the moral if not formal support of America.” Consequently, the editor considered that “to ask them now to break it up like a worn-out plaything” was improper.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ Editorial, *Free Press*, June 1898, p. 2.

⁴⁵ Editorial, *Daily Press*, July 7, 1898, p. 2.

For its part, the *China Mail* started the Spanish-American War exaltedly siding with the Americans. Although during 1897, the newspaper had shared Howard Bray's defenses of the rebellion against Spain, in 1898 it talked about the Filipinos with much more contempt. According to the *Free Press*, the newspaper was not "a friend of Philipinos," but even its correspondent praised on June 29 their ways of conducting the war:

One of the most satisfactory features of the campaign being carried on by General Aguinaldo and his supporters against the Spanish garrison of Manila is the humanity he has displayed and the carefulness with which his orders have been carried out by his officers and men. Towards combatants and non-combatants alike, the insurgents have shown a restraint and consideration which contrasts favorably with the brutal treatment of prisoners and suspects on the others side. There is no need to recount the cruel deeds that have characterized the Spanish attempts to quell the insurrection since it broke out in the Philippine, an insurrection, be it remembered, the direct outcome of harsh and oppressive government by the ruling race. We know, of course, that Aguinaldo has pledged himself to conduct this campaign on humane principles, and by so doing he has earned for the insurgent cause a widespread respect and sympathy that augurs well for the future of the Philippines.⁴⁶

Finally, the *Telegraph* was the hardest critic of the insurgents, as it had been during the first phase of the revolution. Besides Reuter's telegrams and texts from American and British newspapers, most of its information came from lengthy and detailed chronicles about the state of the islands from a Resident Correspondent and a Special Correspondent. As the editor of the newspaper, they both showed an apparent animosity towards the natives.

At first, the paper despised the support Americans could expect from them, and after their positions in the islands progressed, it warned that they were treacherous and would fight along the winning side.⁴⁷ In addition, it admonished that leaving Filipinos in total independence would soon invite a Britain's rival invasion, the newspaper's primary

⁴⁶ "General Agustin's Wife a Hostage," *China Mail*, June 21, p. 3. Also From Our Special Correspondent, "Abandonment of the Spanish Positions," *China Mail*, August 8, 1898, p. 3.

⁴⁷ Editorial, *Telegraph*, May 15, 1898, p. 3; From Our Resident Correspondent, "Further Manila News," *Telegraph*, May 30, p. 3.

concern, and would leave them in internal chaos and anarchy.⁴⁸ Supporting such view were frequent comments implying the ignorance and savagery of the islanders and that, when decontrolled, they could unleash a violence spiral driven by vengeance against the Spaniards that led to terrible massacres.⁴⁹

Despite this, in some of its chronicles, especially in those by its Special Correspondent, although unenthusiastically, the *Telegraph* admitted that Filipino control of the Islands was robust.⁵⁰ On account of that, in one of the multiple texts where they reflected about the future of the Philippines, they stated that “of course the wishes of the Filipinos will have to be taken into account to some extent” to secure a stable government.⁵¹

Therefore, we can conclude that the Civilization Campaign affected all the analyzed newspapers. To different extents, they reproduced basic ideas of that communication effort: their right to be recognized as a belligerent and self-governing nation earned by their lengthy struggle and the U.S. alleged promises, as the *Free Press* argued; their capacity to maintain peace and order and organize a stable government in the territory in their control, as stated by the *Daily Press*; and their respect to the laws of warfare, as the *China Mail* indicated. Even its most radical detractor, the *Telegraph*, recognized that they had to be taken into account when the moment of the deciding the future Administration of the Archipelago arrived.

It is important to insist, however, that in any case, not even those newspapers that were more sympathetic to them, their praise of the Filipino struggle led them to support their total autonomy. Ultimately, although recognized, all the native displays of civilization were tamed by the ethnocentrism of their Western receivers, who kept considering them unprepared for complete self-government. Instead, as summer went by and tensions rose between Filipinos and their American allies, all their close attention to the Filipino struggle served them to alert the U.S. of the need to recognize their strength and

⁴⁸ “Notes and Comments,” Editorial, *Telegraph*, August 3, 1898, p. 2.

⁴⁹ From Our Resident Correspondent, “Manila Notes,” The War, *Telegraph*, August 25, 1898, pp. 2, 3. Also By Our Special Correspondent, The War, *Telegraph*, May 18, 1898, p. 3; From Our Resident Correspondent, The War, *Telegraph*, June 21, 1898, p. 2.

⁵⁰ See “The Situation in the Philippines,” The War, *Telegraph*, May 25, 1898, p. 2; “News from Manila,” The War, *Telegraph*, May 25, 1898, p. 2; News by HMS “Swift,” The War, *Telegraph*, June 6, 1898, p. 2; From Our Special Correspondent, Latest News from Manila,” The War, *Telegraph*, June 6, 1898, p. 2; From Our Own Correspondent, The War, *Telegraph*, June 28, 1898, p. 2; “Latest News from Manila,” The War, *Telegraph*, July 1, 1898, p. 2.

⁵¹ Editorial, *Telegraph*, August 2, 1898, p. 2.

abilities. They harshly criticized the north-American procrastination in openly determining their policy towards the Philippines and reacting to the Philippine Republic growing aspirations before it became an obstacle to the quick restoration of stability and peace under Western tutelage.⁵²

The most eloquent testimony of that position is the *Daily Press's* coverage of the Proclamation of the Philippine Republic, published on October 1. It perfectly exemplifies the Filipino Civilization Campaign through the festival's staging, the Western supremacist ideology that limited its efficacy on foreign observers, and the later's alerts of the dangers of America's lack of pronouncement.⁵³

The chronicler began admitting that “the insurgents were strengthening their hand every day” given the uncertain future disposition of the islands. In case Spain returned, they had to be prepared to fight. If the United States were to hold the Philippines, “they would have already shown military activity and a successful provisional government, because they will have made a showing of what they can do and proved that they do possess qualities of organization and administration.” That display of preparedness, the civilization campaign analyzed in this dissertation, made the journalist praise Emilio Aguinaldo’s “ability and cleverness” and “his ambition to make his people free, and happy.”

Even so, the author expressed restlessness at the leader’s honest endeavors “to prove that as far as they themselves are concerned they are quite worthy of the control.” He hoped he would not be “guilty of such absolute folly” as resisting the American authority in the islands. In his opinion, that would lead to an absolute defeat and would be irrational, as “the U.S. would do its best to treat the natives with all fairness and give them both protection and prosperity.” In addition to these manifested reasons, the correspondent’s depiction of the party, carefully planned to exhibit the aptitudes of the Filipino Government, evidenced that no propaganda could alter the racialist perception of the islanders.

⁵² See, for example, “The Future Government of the Philippines,” *China Mail*, August 1, 1898, p. 3.

⁵³ From our correspondent, “The Position at Manila. The Philippine Republic; The Customs Question; The Admission of Chinese; Manila,” *Daily Press*, October 7, 1898, p. 2.

Besides admitting that the food “was not that bad” and pointing out how all the foreigners received the kindest treatment, the writer debunked with huge condescendence each other aspect of the celebration, for example, the colorful decoration. According to him, “everything was done in the same tawdry, tinsel way that characterizes all Orientals, not even excepting the Japanese.” In commenting on their appearance, he stated:

Perhaps the most amusing side of the festival to foreigners was the appearance of all ministers and members of congress in black evening dress and high black hats. It was almost grotesque to see these dark skinned natives in the heat of mid-day marching through the streets and assembling in black evening dress, especially as not one suit in ten fitted the wearer, while the hats looked as if they had been collected from the four corners of the earth.



Image 9: Opening of the Malolos Congress at Barasoain Church, in September 15, 1898.

Despite this, he asked readers not to be too critical, as the natives, “kindly-inclined, good people,” did their best and knew no better. He even recognized that they “made an impressive appearance” as a solemn occasion like the ratification of their Declaration of Independence required. By playing their part to perfection, they gave “plain evidence that with proper coaching and education they can eventually assist in the government of the islands to a greatest degree that was first deemed possible.” Allegedly, he shared those scornful comments because he feared the natives would also build a “shady, showy Government provided they are granted autonomy or independence,” which was “the great central idea through everything said and omitted at Malolos.” He concluded his chronicle alerting of the risk of allowing that “both leaders and people become so imbued -even intoxicated- with the idea of independence by all these celebrations, proclamations, speeches, and gatherings that there will be serious difficulty in reconciling them even to American sovereignty.”⁵⁴

This account, therefore, proves once more that during Summer 1898, the Filipino Civilization Campaign impacted foreign observers. Nevertheless, it also illustrates that its translation on political rights and autonomy had insurmountable limits, and Filipino complete independence was always out of the question for the analyzed press. The following section argues that, since the outbreak of the conflict, the region’s newspapers considered an American Protectorate the best government for the islands. Although that was the solution already envisaged in the British metropolitan press, journals in the Pacific specified that the native government had to participate in its constitution and deserved a significant role in the future regime because it was more mature than their contemporaries believed. When Spain and the U.S. discussed the Philippine Question during the Peace Conference in the fall of that same year, the examined newspapers insisted on establishing such a model. To defend it, some journalists joined the Filipino Civilization Campaign.⁵⁵

⁵⁴ From our correspondent, “The Position at Manila,” *Daily Press*, October 7, 1898, p. 2. Also, the *Telegraph* offered similar comments about the dressing and the decorations in its chronicle: From Our Resident Correspondent, “The Proclamation of the Philippine Republic,” *Telegraph*, October 4, 1898, p. 2. In contrast, following with its sympathy to the Filipino cause, the *Free Press* reprinted an opposite depiction of exactly the same events: “The Philippine National Assembly,” *Free Press*, October 3, 1898, p. 3.

⁵⁵ Since the Battle of Cavite, the analyzed press alerted that the Islands' future would be the “big crux” of the negotiations, as “in many aspects is calculated to create issues of a pregnant and far-reaching nature,” and reflected about who and how should govern them. Editorial, *Free Press*, August 13, 1898, p. 2.

3.3 The Advocacy for a Protectorate during the Peace Conference

During the Spanish-American War, all the British press in the Pacific studied vindicated that Spain had to abandon the Philippine Islands. They justified this position referencing its maladministration of the archipelago, its inhuman treatment of the local inhabitants, and the fact that these would keep fighting their oppressors, extending the instability harmful for those with interests in the region. The *Free Press* stated it, for example, in the following editorial, which also reflects its defense of the native administration again:

If then, the Joint Commission is to imply the smallest reassertion of Spanish authority [...], the American people, or their mandatories, will be responsible for the beginning of an interminable civil war in the Philippines where now, within the jurisdiction of Aguinaldo and his civil magistrates, all is peace: life and property, even of Spaniards, respected: revenue peacefully collected and applied to public purposes; and all the decencies of good government and justice faithfully and impartially observed.⁵⁶

On the other hand, the region's publications considered that, in case of standing alone, the new Philippine republic would invite other powers' conquests, especially Germany, which threatened British dominion in Asia and its Open-Door Policies.⁵⁷ Having also dismissed a joint protectorate between different countries, they agreed with its London contemporaries that the U.S. was responsible for remaining in the archipelago.⁵⁸

The examined papers also coincided with the metropole's opinion in defending that Americans had to follow British governance models like those applied in Egypt, the Straits Settlements, or some parts of India to compensate for their inexperience in colonial rule. These were cases of an "Anglo Protectorate model of enlightened governance over those unfit for self-government" that, according to Patrick Kirkwood, loomed large in Britain and the U.S.'s public imagination at the turn of the XXth Century. Figures like Lord Cromer or Thomas Babington Macaulay, which appeared cited in the studied press, impersonated the "erudite Anglo-administrator overseeing the

⁵⁶ Editorial, *Free Press*, August 2, 1898, p. 2. Also Editorial, *Free Press*, August 15, 1898, p. 2; Editorial, *China Mail*, August 4, 1898, p. 2.

⁵⁷ Editorial, *Free Press*, August 2, 1898, p. 2; "The Future of the Philippines," *Free Press* [Reprinted from the *Daily Press*], May 5, 1898, p. 2; Editorial, *China Mail*, August 4, 1898, p. 2.

⁵⁸ Editorial, *Free Press*, August 29, 1898, p. 2.

racial and administrative progress of peoples unfitted for self-government.”⁵⁹ Their rules guaranteed a financially responsible, clean, efficient, and representative colonial government until the colonized achieved political modernity according to Anglo-Saxon doctrines.

The particularities of those protectorates could be adapted to different contexts. According to Kirkwood, some of these colonial supervisors considered government capabilities acquired through history and experience, while others saw them as an *innate* trait that belonged exclusively to distinctive governing races. Consequently, they disagreed on the length of tutelage required. The believers on the racial uplift of the colonized considered it should last until they achieved the necessary level of political maturity, so, in the end, the imperial tutor’s presence would be limited. Meanwhile, skeptics of the colonized’s capacity to evolve advocated for the permanent rule of the distinctive governing races.⁶⁰ Likewise, the inclusion of those tutored populations in these colonial administrations could also vary.

Along this line, as we have seen before, the British imperialist press based a good deal of its defense for an American administration on the assumption that the natives were savages that still needed to “be uplifted and gradually brought into the light of Western Civilization.”⁶¹ Moreover, they defended that their resistance would not last. Although many journalists in the region initially agreed with these assumptions their local perspective nuanced it.

On the one hand, even those who were less sympathetic with the Filipinos acknowledged their newly-founded republic had to participate in establishing the future regime in the islands for strategical considerations. They knew it controlled most of the archipelago and warned that “if the Americans were determined to refuse self-government to the Filipinos, they w[ould] have to subjugate them by what we fear will prove a long and sanguinary war.”⁶² It is interesting to note that other men-on-the-spot not related to the media shared this perception. M^a Dolores Elizalde analyzed British

⁵⁹ Patrick M. Kirkwood, “An ‘Administrative Race’? Anglo-Saxonism and Imperial Administrative Networks in The Philippines and Southern Africa, c. 1898-1921” (University of Michigan, 2015), 51, 52.

⁶⁰ Kirkwood, “An ‘Administrative Race’? Anglo-Saxonism and Imperial Administrative Networks in The Philippines and Southern Africa, c. 1898-1921.”

⁶¹ Harris, *God’s Arbiters*, 133.

⁶² “From news received by way of Australia...,” *Daily Press*, January 7, 1898, p. 2.

Navy officials' reports about the situation in the archipelago and demonstrated that although they initially mistrusted the Filipino capacity for self-government, they also ended up reporting that republic's strength made it necessary to negotiate with them.⁶³

In other cases, some Hong Kong and Singapore newspapermen's close coverage of the natives' behavior during the insurrection against Spain and the Spanish-American War made them held distinctive attitudes towards the Philippine republic. Besides having an updated and detailed knowledge of their military control of the islands, these journalists highlighted that they already possessed an advanced level of political maturity and deserved respect.

As a consequence, they all advocated for recognizing the Philippine republic as a belligerent in the Spanish-American War, and its consequent right to participate in deciding the future government of the islands and take part in it. In broad terms, they all considered that America should control the country's foreign relations and protect it from foreign invasion. Internally, the studied press had diverse opinions on which levels of competencies Filipinos should achieve. However, they all concurred with the *China Mail* when it said the inhabitants could appreciate "fairly liberal government," and that "those facilities they would obtain to as full an extent as circumstances permitted (upon Anglo-Saxon, i.e. American lines)."⁶⁴ For example, this newspaper suggested the locals handled municipal freedom. The *Singapore Free Press* defended that they could occupy higher positions in many more governmental departments, and the native government should "settle its own fiscal arrangements, its legislation, its administration of justice, its police, its education system-but always, where misadventure may be possible, guided by professional advisers, selected, if necessary, by itself, but subject to the approval or disapproval of the American Resident-General."⁶⁵ As for the *Daily Press*, it defended that "the conduct of the Filipinos during the past eight months justifies confidence being reposed in them to the extent of allowing them autonomy under these guarantees."⁶⁶

⁶³ M^aDolores Elizalde Pérez-Grueso, "Observing the Imperial Transition: British Naval Reports on the Philippines, 1898-1901," *Diplomatic History* 40, no. 2 (2016): 219–43.

⁶⁴ Editorial, *China Mail*, August 4, 1898, p. 2.

⁶⁵ Editorial, *Free Press*, December 12, 1898, p. 2. See also Editorial, *Free Press*, August 2, 1898, p. 2; Editorial, *Free Press*, August 19, 1898, p. 2.

⁶⁶ Editorial, *Daily Press*, January 1, 1898, p. 2. Also Editorial, *Daily Press*, December 31, 1898, p. 2

In their opinion, this system satisfied all the parties. The U.S. could enjoy the riches and strategic position of the islands, contribute to Anglo-Saxonism's civilizing mission, and reform its national civil service. Filipinos would also accept this arrangement and prove they were "a progressive, law-abiding community, aspiring and striving after such independent functions of self-government as might be safe for them to endeavour to acquire, in the face of the overruling fact that their country would be, left to itself, the mere battle-ground of foreign antagonisms."⁶⁷ At last, but not least, the beneficial influence of America in the Far East" could prevent "the disturbance of political power in such a manner as to paralyze the action of the peace-loving and commerce-promoting nationalities already well-established on the shores of the Pacific -Britain, Japan, and the United States." The *Free Press* added:

The collective interests, political and commercial, of these powers are of an absolutely overwhelming character, and the less the chance of conspiracy to disturb those interests the better for humanity at large. [...] The only solution is an American protectorate, ostensibly temporary, possibly, over the Philippines, thus at once, furnishing a lever for the liberation and elevation of a long oppressed and much-enduring people, and a security against the intrusion of disturbing influences, permanently unfriendly to the United States and to the nations whose sympathies and aspirations in the Pacific are thoroughly consonant with her own.⁶⁸

To defend this formula, between the war's end, in August 1898, and the Paris Peace Treaty ratification in the U.S., in February 1899, all the analyzed press, without exception, advocated for it in their editorials and chronicles or reprinted texts from their London contemporaries that conveyed the convenience of a protectorate.⁶⁹ In the

⁶⁷ Editorial, *Free Press*, August 15, 1898, p. 2. Also "Mr. H.W. Bray on the Future of the Philippines", *Free Press*, June 25, 1898, p. 2; "The chief representative of the Philippine...", *Free Press*, August 4, 1898, p. 2; "The Future of the Philippines," *Free Press*, August 5, 1898, p. 2; Editorial, *Daily Press*, January 1, 1899, p. 2.

⁶⁸ Editorial, *Free Press*, August 2, 1898, p. 2.

⁶⁹ See, for example: "More than one...", *Telegraph*, September 19, 1898, p. 2; "What America Should Do," *Telegraph* [Reprinted from *The Critic*], December 17, 1898, p. 2; "The Situation in the Philippines," *China Mail*, September 27, 1898, p. 3; "Admiral Dewey and Aguinaldo," *China Mail* [Reprinted from *Globe*]; "The Future of the Philippines," *China Mail*, [Reprinted from *The Standard*], December 16, 1898, p. 3; Editorial, *China Mail*, December 29, 1898, p. 2; "The Future of the Philippines," *China Mail* [Reprinted from the *London and China Express*], January 6, 1899, p. 3; Dr. Clau MacCauley, "The Philippines Crisis. A Solution Proposed," *China Mail*, January 15, 1899, p. 3; "The Filipino Side of the Question," *China Mail*, January 16, 1899, p. 3; Editorial, *Daily Press*, December 31, 1898, p. 2.

newspapers less well-disposed towards the Filipinos, like the *China Mail*, some Protectorate defenses included comments that despised the natives. They warned Filipino strength was a danger Americans caused by not limiting the republic's ambitions.⁷⁰ Nevertheless, the newspaper also included accounts of their correspondents in the islands and other observers that praised the Filipino cause and their efforts.⁷¹

In addition, all the studied press republished texts from the Hong Kong Junta, especially, from British sympathizers identified in the Filipino revolutionaries' private correspondence: Howard W. Bray, their press representative already presented in chapter 1; William St. Clair, the mentioned editor of the *Free Press*; and Chesney Duncan, ex-editor and journalist of the *Telegraph*. Evidence indicates that St. Clair and Duncan actively collaborated with the republic's propaganda efforts because they were confident of a Protectorate's success in the Philippines following British models.

In William St. Clair's case, he had expressed such conviction much before publishing all the content cited in this chapter. In 1896, this editor wrote regarding the Philippines' troubles that Spain had "to apply British principles in her relations with her Colonies."⁷² Later, he actively sought that type of regime for the archipelago. Seeing that the U.S. arrival to the Pacific scenario was imminent, St. Clair got Howard W. Bray and Consul-General Spencer Pratt in touch to vehicle the Filipino-American collaboration in their fight against Spain. In a text published in December 1898, he justified his step arguing why Consul-General Pratt was the proper person to link both nations. He alleged that Americans would "have the initial advantage of securing him a *persona grata* with the Filipinos," and also "one who is convinced of the necessity of following out the already well defined British precedents in dealing with the problems of a Philippine Protectorate."⁷³ Therefore, St. Clair covered Filipino affairs since the first phase of the revolution hoping to create authority in the islands similar to the British one.

⁷⁰ From an Observer, "The Situation in the Philippines," *China Mail*, December 28, 1898, p. 3; "Crisis in the Philippines. Strained Relations with the Americans. Outline of Filipino Programme," *China Mail*, January 5, 1899, p. 3.

⁷¹ From Our Correspondent, "Aguinaldo's Withdrawal. Meeting of the Filipino Congress," *Daily Press*, September 21, 1898, p. 2; "The Philippine Question. Impression on Holiday," *China Mail*, September 21, 1898, p. 3; From Our Own Correspondent, "Almost a Crisis Between American and Insurgent Forces," *Daily Press*, December 31, 1898, p. 2; "An American Professor on the Situation," *China Mail*, January 14, 1899, p. 3;

⁷² Editorial, *Free Press*, December 22, 1896, p. 2.

⁷³ "The Philippino Question," *Telegraph* [Reprinted from the *Free Press* from December 7], December 14, 1898, p. 3.

Using John Galbraith's term, this editor was a man on the spot, and his local perspective and life-long implication in the British Malaysian Society influenced this strong opinion on the Philippine Question.⁷⁴ St. Clair participated in the expansion of British Influence and prosperity in the Malay States by joining the military in Pahang in 1892 and engaging in civic organizations. Among others, he was one of the promoters of the Singapore branch of the Straits Settlement Association, that "watched over the commercial and other interests of the community," served as a Justice of Peace, helped in the foundation of the Singapore Philharmonic Society in 1891, and organized the Singapore Volunteer Rifles in 1901.⁷⁵

As the "Doyen of the press in Malaya," according to his second editor Walter Makepeace, St. Clair behaved as "a leader in all that affected the welfare of the Colony and the Federated Malay States, dealing trenchantly with such subjects as the military contribution, constitutional rights, public health and safety, the encouragement of arts, the spread of popular education—all, indeed that furthered the common weal."⁷⁶ From that position, the leader of the *Free Press* had praised the expansion of British influence in the Malay Peninsula and considered that a similar model, with its adaptability, could apply to the Philippines.⁷⁷ He directly compared both cases in an editorial published in September 1898:

We protect Native States on the Malay Peninsula. The administration is very largely manned by British officials, but the Malay Rulers' flags fly there, they

⁷⁴ John S. Galbraith, "The 'Turbulent Frontier' as a Factor in British Expansion," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 2, no. 2 (1960): 157–63.

⁷⁵ "Doyen of Straits Press. Departure of Major St. Clair," *Malaya Tribune*, March 4, 1916, p. 9; "Mr. W. G. St. Clair," *Free Press*, March 31, 1916, p. 7; Walter Makepeace, Gilbert E. Brooke, and John Braddell Roland, *One Hundred Years of Singapore* (London: J. Murray, 1921), 291. According to a report published in 1935 in the *Singapore Free Press* about the history of the paper ("The Singapore Free Press and the Men Who Have Made it," October 8, 1935, p. 1), St. Clair wrote his memories and left the "bulk of it in type-script in the library of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society." This institution's archives belong now to the National Library of Singapore and, after long research through their catalog and consulting online with its archivists, the author could not find it. Still, the in-person localization and analysis of those documents promises to be an interesting endeavor for those interested in local and imperial politics.


⁷⁶ "Mr. W. G. St. Clair," *Free Press*.

⁷⁷ See, for example, the editorial the newspaper published about Andrew Clarke, governor between 1873–1875, "who initiated the policy of Protected Native States in the Malay Peninsula:" Editorial, *Free Press*, April 2, 1902, p. 2. For a brief overview of the resident system's expansion in Malaysia, see Ingelise L. Lanman, "Thorns in the Water: Britain in Malaya," in *The Man on the Spot. Essays on British Empire History*, ed. Roger D. Long (Westport, Conn.; London: Greenwood Press, 1995), 183–200. Also, C.M. Turnbull, *A History of Singapore, 1819-1988* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1989); Barbara Watson Andaya, *A History of Malaysia* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001).

have their own legislation, and their revenues are absolutely safe from Imperial confiscation. The value of a protectorate system, as we British know so well, lies in its infinite elasticity, and its marvelous adaptability to special and dissimilar conditions. [...] Then again, the institution of a protectorate may be of a temporary character. The protecting power is not tied down to its maintenance any longer than a regard for its own interests demands. Even then, as a temporary solution of the problem in the Philippines, it would be difficult to adduce any genuine practical argument against an American protectorate, while against any other alternative it would be far from difficult to produce destructive reasons, from the standpoint that the maintenance of peace in the Far East was an essential condition to the right evolution of the destiny of the Philippines.

Furthermore, St. Clair understood that Americans might well hesitate in accepting this role “were the population savage of unprogressive,” and considered that “the more nearly self-sufficient the locally set up administration may appear to be, as far even as provincial self-government is concerned, the more fully would the United States feel justified in according its protection to that people.”⁷⁸ That manifest concern explains that he actively collaborated with the Filipinos to prove to the U.S. how self-sufficient they were, even if the level of autonomy he envisaged was more limited than the one the Filipino leaders demanded.

⁷⁸ Editorial, *Free Press*, September 2, 1898, p. 2.



Images 10 and 11. On top: Portrait of William Graeme St Clair by Benjamin Stone (May 19, 1909). Above: Portrait of Chesney Duncan.⁷⁹

⁷⁹ St. Clair's portrait is retrieved from the National Portrait Gallery, London. Duncan's one from Arnold Wright, *Twentieth Century Impressions of Hong-Kong, Shanghai, and Other Treaty Ports of China* (London: Lloyd's Greater Britain Publishing Company, 1908), 268.

In Chesney Duncan's case, his evolution towards becoming one of the Filipino's press representatives was much more drastic. His first work in the Asia was as an assistant in Korean customs, where he took part in "the opening of the Hermit Kingdom to the trade and commerce of the world in 1883." Soon, he began working as a journalist for several British newspapers in the region, like the *Telegraph*, the *Japan Gazette*, the *Shanghai Mercury*, the *China Times* (published in Tientsin), and, occasionally, in Hong Kong's *China Mail*. As a resident of that Island Colony, Duncan "took an active and beneficent part in public affairs."⁸⁰ Among other activities, he organized the British Mercantile Marine Officers' Association and served during the plague epidemic the city suffered in 1894. Therefore, Duncan was a man on the spot with a particular perception of the region's geopolitics, like William St. Clair.

During the Filipino revolution's earlier stages, in 1896-97, Duncan was the *Hong Kong Telegraph* editor. As seen in chapter 2, this newspaper claimed that white supremacy in the region had to be unquestionable and, thus, it supported Spain and attacked the contemporaries that sympathized with the Filipino rebels. When the U.S. joined the fray in 1898, using Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds' term, that newspaper redrew the "global colour line" it had established to back the White race against the Asian one and relocated the limits of its loyalty to support, among the White population, the Anglo-Saxon against the Latin race.⁸¹ As for the Filipinos, the *Telegraph* recognized their advances in the archipelago, but did not show any sympathy towards them and still shared many derogatory comments about their supposed savagery, violent instincts and ignorance.

By contrast, when the tensions between the Americans and Filipinos began to appear as a severe threat to the future peace of the Islands, that newspaper published more texts giving voice to the native leaders and trying to understand which policy they would defend if they could negotiate a protectorate with the U.S. That is the primary concern of an interview to Emilio Aguinaldo published in September 1898, right before the Peace Conference began.

⁸⁰ Walter Makepeace, "The Press," in *Twentieth Century Impressions of Hong-Kong, Shanghai, and Other Treaty Ports of China*, ed. Arnold Wright (London: Lloyd's Greater Britain Publishing Company, 1908), 262.

⁸¹ Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, *Drawing the Global Colour Line* (Cambridge University Press, 2008).

Its author was the *Telegraph*'s Resident Correspondent in Manila, and tried to get the leader's impression on the policy the Philippines should adopt. According to his account, the correspondent "tried to put before him various possibilities of the intricate and complicated problem now coming forward for solution." All the alternatives the interviewer cited were precisely "the multifarious forms of autonomy in vogue in British India and Malaysia," the England suzerainty in Egypt, or autonomy such as that of the State of Selangor, or Johore, showing his British frame of understanding. In spite of the journalist's pressure, Aguinaldo dedicated his responses to highlighting that he was only the "First Citizen," and that he would obey the National Assembly.⁸²

This meeting took place shortly after the U.S. press mocked Aguinaldo's proclamation as *Dictador de Filipinas* and used it to impute authoritarian tendencies to the Tagalog elite.⁸³ Given the *Presidente*'s insistence in the National Assembly's supreme power, it seems he was clumsily trying to present his rule as truly democratic. His success was limited, as the journalist admitted that such humbleness could be a good sign. However, the reporter was also alarmed at the General's "expression of helplessness and ignorance." He warned that, as a result of the lack of education in the Spanish dominions, Aguinaldo actually knew "very little of statecraft, forms of government, history of constitutional development, and actual facts of quasi-autonomous administrations." He grew suspicious at his frequent *no sabe*, and to get him talking, he defended the importance of letting the world know the Filipinos and their aspirations:

...[I] tried again to show him that it was of the utmost importance for the good of the Philippines that the world should know as much as possible of the Filipinos and their views just now, and that he, as the duly elected 'First Citizen' ought to be better qualified than any other man in the world to speak for them and ought to be well posted on the various possible proposals for the future of the Islands. [...] Aguinaldo must have looked deeply into these questions, and must be able to tell the world what his people thought of their own future. The world could never be expected to place confidence in a leader or a race of whom it knew nothing.⁸⁴

⁸² From Our Resident Correspondent, "Aguinaldo Interviewed," *Telegraph*, September 24, 1898, p. 3.

⁸³ See St. Clair's private discussion regarding this topic in Chapter 1.

⁸⁴ "Aguinaldo Interviewed," *Telegraph*.

Although Duncan had moved to the Philippines to report the previous June, we cannot confirm he did this interview because it is unsigned, and the paper received correspondence from at least two different people in the Philippines.⁸⁵ However, it seems highly possible Duncan wrote it as the texts he autographed from that moment on responded precisely to the concern expressed in the text: letting the world know the nature and aspirations of the Filipinos to find the best arrangement for the territory they inhabited. The journalist announced he would issue a weekly journal in Hong Kong “devoted to the interest of the Filipino people, the great object being to give publicity to the true facts of the situation, and to enable the world to understand more fully the real aims, aspirations, and civil capacities of the inhabitants of the Philippines.” Its goal was the “mutual understanding that can alone be the stable basis of a satisfactory working relationship between the United States Government and the republican Government on the Philippines.”⁸⁶ Moreover, the Junta Filipina recognized Duncan as a “General Advisor.”⁸⁷ He joined Howard W. Bray and William St. Clair in projecting Filipino voices to the world.

3.4 The Joint Fight for Filipino Voices Abroad

Chapter 2 demonstrated that the Filipino Civilization Campaign in the Pacific British media had started in the Revolution’s first phase. As seen in the previous section, it achieved a louder echo during the celebration of the Paris Peace Conference in the fall of 1898, when the examined newspapers defended working with the existing Filipino Government to create a protectorate following British models. It was even higher, however, right after the signing of the resulting treaty, on December 10. Spain and the U.S. had conducted the negotiations bilaterally, excluding the involved colonized nations. In the Philippines case, Spain agreed to sell the islands to the Americans for 20 million dollars, and both went “perilously near to convincing the Filipino people and the Filipino Government that they are but exchanging King Log for King Stork.”⁸⁸

⁸⁵ Editorial, *Free Press*, June 17, 1898, p. 2.

⁸⁶ Editorial, *Free Press*, December 21, 1898, p. 2. See also Editorial, *Telegraph*, December 12, 1898, p. 21.

⁸⁷ Teodoro A. Agoncillo, *Malolos: The Crisis of the Republic* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 1960), 370.

⁸⁸ Editorial, *Free Press*, December 12, 1898, p. 2.

As a response, between the fall of 1898 and the outbreak of the Philippine-American War, on February 4, 1899, the Hong Kong Junta and its British media allies pressed even more persistently to make the Americans recognize the Republic. Most of these vindications first appeared in St. Clair's *Singapore Free Press*, but other neighbor contemporaries without explicit links to the Filipino belligerents reprinted some of them or agreed with some of their arguments in their original texts.⁸⁹

As before, the campaigners insisted on defending the Republic's preparedness for a high level of self-government, but other arguments won protagonism. Intimately related to their propaganda about Filipino civilization was their criticisms that western audiences had an incomplete and distorted image of the geopolitical and social situation of the islands and underestimated its inhabitants' level of development. The Junta and its sympathizers defended that the United States leaders and the public still had not been able to "grasp the nature of the problems that have accrued as a result of the war with Spain," because they did not have any previous knowledge about the Philippines and were failing to estimate the internal position of things.

Instead, the United States public was well posted about Cuba, took it as a guiding analogy, and applied it to the Philippines case. According to St. Clair, that had proven a colossal mistake because "the Filipino people are as compact and unanimous as the Cubans are incapable of hanging together." Aguinaldo had built a "strong Government, justified by its military triumphs," and his regime had "resolved itself on a constitutional basis, into a civil administration" that dictated "its dealings with its now defeated oppressors with manifest humanity." Unfortunately, the editor warned that "the internal knowledge of all this is not readily accessible to American observers, chiefly moving in military or club circles in Manila, and therefore imbued with the combative spirit."⁹⁰

In addition to attacking a general lack of knowledge, they accused specific actors of twisting the representation of the Filipino Government, like the Spanish religious orders and foreigners with economic interests that benefited from the *status quo*. For example, both Emilio Aguinaldo, in an interview, and Howard W. Bray, in an article, blamed a

⁸⁹ See for example, "Further Filipino Success," October 13, 1898, p. 4 and "The Filipino Revolution," October 26, 1898, p. 4, both from the *China Mail* but reprinted from the *Free Press*, or "The Filipino Side of the Question," *China Mail*, January 16, 1899, p. 4.

⁹⁰ Editorial, *Free Press*, January 13, 1899, p. 2.

strong partisan of the Spaniards named Eugenio Blanco for producing a plot to incite a clash between the Filipinos and the Americans in Pampanga. According to Bray's account, Blanco's troops had joined Aguinaldo's army, accepted bribes from the Church, and tried to infiltrate "some of the bad characters always to be found in every country" in the Filipino ranks to generate trouble. Although the authorities uncovered the conspiracy before it could do any serious harm, Bray denounced it as only one example of extended operations of "political trickery."⁹¹

Such efforts aimed to "suppressing important facts, magnifying molehills into mountains, and even stooping to base motives with the manifest object of damaging the reputation of the young Philippine Government, and influencing public opinion [...] by unworthy means." To make things worse, those deceptions joined the yellow journals' pandering for sensation and the ignorance and popular inclinations of the audiences and of "individual special and so-called resident correspondents" unable to discriminate between reality and biased information.

To those audiences that believed all the denounced misapprehensions of the situation and who, as a result, proclaimed that Filipinos should not be allowed an opportunity to govern themselves, he replied citing Thomas Babington Macaulay, one of the previously mentioned referents of the Anglo-Protectorate models. Such ending reveals how Bray, working for Filipinos since the revolution's beginning, also reflected on the Philippine Question through British lenses. At least, he understood which cultural idioms he had to use to convince his targeted audience:

'Many politicians are in the habit of laying down as a self-evident proposition that no people ought to be free till they are fit to use their freedom. The maxim is worthy of the fool in the old story who resolved not to go into the water till he had learned to swim.'⁹²

⁹¹ H.W. Bray, "The Filipinos and the Americans. Poltroonery of Correspondents," *Free Press*, September 28, 1898, p. 3. Aguinaldo narrated the same plot in the following interview: "The Baby Parliament. A Young Legislature Tackling an Old Difficulty. Who is to Find the Funds?" *Telegraph*, October 4, 1898, p. 3, 4. Also, "The Independent, (of November 10,)," *Free Press*, December 20, 1898, p. 2; H. W. Bray, "The Philippines Question," December 22, 1898, p. 3; Howard W. Bray, "A true Account of Aguinaldo," *Free Press*, April 4, 1899, p. 3.

⁹² H.W. Bray, "The Filipinos and the Americans. Poltroonery of Correspondents."

As Bray already hinted in his text, besides revealing the lack of knowledge on Philippine matters and the attempts to manipulate it, the Junta and its sympathizers also argued that some foreign correspondents and news organizations were well aware of those political machinations and even participated in it. Chesney Duncan stated that he sent several texts to the Associated Press to correct their mistakes and added that, in some cases, they had voluntarily twisted his own corrections.⁹³ Also, he criticized the American journalist Edward Harden's professionalism and objectivity.⁹⁴

Equally, St. Clair denounced the distortion of a Reuter's telegram about the significant Spanish surrender in Iloilo, "the last remnant of Spanish authority in the Visayas." While the version published in Madrid stated the city surrendered to the Americans, the editor alleged that a much more reliable account coming directly from Iloilo and sent to Manila by a Singapore gentleman demonstrated it was Filipino commanders who had carried out an amicable and regular capitulation. It was important to get the version of the affair straight because it exemplified, once more, how the National Government had occupied almost all the Spanish territory, save Manila, maintained law and order, and had to be recognized *de facto* and *de iure* by the Americans.⁹⁵ Later, in his editorial of January 17, he stated that "whether it be in the Spanish interest or not, there have been persistent efforts made by cable and correspondence, both from Manila and London, to discredit the Filipino National Government." The apparent motive was to "entice the United States into a forward policy that would ignore the strength of the Filipino government, and eventually bring about inevitable hostility and discord."⁹⁶

⁹³ On the Associated Press dispatches, see: Chesney Duncan, "The Philippine Crisis," *Free Press*, January 18, 1899, p. 3; "The Situation in the Philippines," *Free Press* [reprinted from *Telegraph*], January 23, 1899, p. 2. "The Philippine Crisis and the Cable (Telegrams to the Press Association)," *Free Press*, February 3, 1899, p. 3; Chesney Duncan, "Distorted Telegrams," *Daily Press*, March 8, 1899, 2. See also, in the Philippine Insurgent Records "Special correspondence published Chesney Duncan Telegrams," February, 1899, 492.2.

⁹⁴ See "The Philippine Situation," *Free Press*, January 11, 1899, p. 2.

⁹⁵ Editorial, *Free Press*, December 29, 1898, p. 2. The chronicle in which he bases his reflection is From Our Own Traveller, "Latest From Ilo-Ilo," *Free Press*, December 29, 1898, p. 3. Other comments by St. Clair about the National Government misrepresentation: Editorial, *Free Press*, January 5, 1899, p. 2; Editorial, *Free Press*, January 9, 1899, p. 2; Editorial, *Free Press*, January 25, 1899, p. 2.

⁹⁶ Editorial, *Free Press*, January 17, 1899, p. 2.

As the hostility of the U.S. increased and the prospects of a diplomatic solution to the existing tension faded away, another of the pre-meditated misrepresentations they tried to correct was that Filipinos had a hostile and provocative attitude with the American troops in the islands. The most eloquent example is the “Appeal by the Philipinos” written by the Hong Kong Junta and published on December 13, 1898. It pointed out that “despite what others were saying,” Filipinos had done all they could “to prevent a conflict,” and supported that statement reviewing how they had acceded to every American request during the war with Spain, even when those were irrational. Next, it asked if “the cruel allegations that they would murder, loot, steal and commit incendiarism if given a free hand were supported” after seeing that “they conducted their campaign throughout Luzon, capturing all important points outside Manila, taking and treating humanely thousands of Spanish prisoners without being guilty of such acts.” To conclude, it implored “the intervention of the President, supported by the will of the people, to put an end to the slights shown to our leaders, officials, soldiers, and people by some of the American military and naval authorities and soldiers.”⁹⁷

From January 1899, this final claim that the Americans were acting disrespectfully and even aggressively towards the natives was each time more familiar.⁹⁸ Among other representative cases, Howard Bray wrote long chronicle that denounced American troops' abuses against the Filipinos.⁹⁹ There stands out as well a long letter by an American initially published in the *República Filipina* that “confirms the unfavorable reports about the American army of occupation from other sources considered to be prejudiced.” On the one hand, the dispatch aimed to defend that the Filipino Republic had rightfully won its independence in the war against Spain, to which it was fully

⁹⁷ “Appeal by the Filipinos,” *Free Press*, December 13, 1898, p. 3. Also “The United States and the Filipino People Government,” *Free Press*, January 5, 1899, p. 2; “General Aguinaldo and General Otis,” *Free Press*, November 30, 1898, p. 3; Chesney Duncan, “The Philippine Question. International law on the Subject (Opinion of Hongkong barrister at law),” *Free Press*, December 7, 1898, p. 3; H. W. Bray, “The Philippines Question,” December 22, 1898, p. 3.

⁹⁸ For example: Emilio Aguinaldo, “Manifesto of the President of the Philippine Government,” *Free Press* [Reprinted from the Special Supplement of the *Herald of the Revolution* (Official Organ)], January 18, 1899, p. 3; “The Filipino Commissioners to the United States,” *Free Press*, January 5, 1899, p. 2; Reuters, “The hostility to the Americans...,” *Free Press*, January 23, 1899, p. 3; Ludovico, “The Philippines,” *Free Press* [Reprinted from *Shanghai Daily Press*], December 16, 1898, o. 3; Apolinario Mabini, “The Philippine Republic. Address of the Council to the National Congress,” *Free Press*, January 26, 1898, p. 2; “Philippine Autonomy,” *Free Press*, May 19, 1899, p. 3.

⁹⁹ Howard W. Bray, “American Behavior in the Philippines. Facts that Speak for Themselves (to the Editor),” *Free Press*, February 2, 1899, p. 2. For the reply by a British reader: “A local correspondent writes...,” *Free Press*, February 8, 1899, p. 2.

entitled, “the country being just as cultured as any other, and one that our own land does not even equal for polished manners.” On the other hand, it condemned U.S.’s actions by lamenting, among other charges, that “during the five months we have been half established here, the scandals committed by our soldiers have been countless.”¹⁰⁰

To conclude, another thesis the Hong Kong Junta and its British sympathizers asserted was that the Philippine Occupation violated America’s supposed republican core values. They became central to their propaganda, knowing that anti-imperialist groups spread these same arguments inside the U.S. Their use is prominent in an editorial published after General Elwell Otis released the proclamation in January 1899 that declared American sovereignty in the Philippines and avoided recognizing the revolutionary government. St. Clair denounced that Filipinos were trying to do what the New England States did in 1775. Prohibiting such a course was betraying the cause of liberty and becoming the imposers of an alien rule, “possibly well-meaning, but quite incapable of understanding how hopelessly destructive of all future good influence this course implies.”¹⁰¹ On another occasion, he stated that “the natural rights of man, of nationality, the unity of Republican principles, the equality and fraternity of democratic institutions, are requested, by the United States, to go to the devil.” He defended that it was only in the Filipino side where “real civilization, real love for liberty, a real regard for the integrity of Republican principle” lay, not “in the side of the *soi-disant* liberators.”¹⁰²

Citing some of their thoughts and emphasizing the anti-imperialists’ influence in the U.S., St. Clair was also insinuating there was hope for stopping McKinley’s occupation and establishing the Protectorate “they had advocated since the beginning.” It did not imply any vicious alternation of the fundamental principles of the U.S. Constitution, supported Hoar’s policy of non-intrusion, provided the U.S. with “a point d’appui for proper influence in the Far East,” and yet preserved to “the National Filipino government their entire freedom and self-respect as to domestic administration.”¹⁰³

¹⁰⁰ Dr. Brown Riseux Legnez, “An American View of General Otis' Proclamation,” *Free Press*, January 24, 1899, p. 3.

¹⁰¹ Editorial, *Free Press*, January 6, 1899, p. 2. See also Editorial, *Free Press*, December 13, 1898, p. 2.

¹⁰² Editorial, *Free Press*, January 10, 1899, p. 2.

¹⁰³ Editorial, *Free Press*, January 11, 1899, p. 2. Also Editorial, *Free Press*, January 12, 1899, p. 2; Editorial, *Free Press*, January 20, 1899, p. 2.

Although this chapter cited a limited selection of texts to exemplify their main arguments, Chesney Duncan and William St. Clair published many other contributions to the Filipino Civilization Campaign during December 1898 and February 1899. The accusations of American misbehavior they shared raised significant criticisms from other papers. Next to the warnings of censorship in the same Hong Kong press, they suggest that, without those newspapermen's help, bringing into light Filipino versions of the story would have been even more challenging. On account of that, even though they did not support Filipino complete Independence, they made a vital contribution to their cause. They attempted to transmit their situation to an audience that would not have read *La Independencia* or *El Heraldo de la Revolución* to discover the Filipino point of view but who, in the end, had the most influence in the conflict: the British and American public opinions.

The final chapter of this dissertation will examine the efficacy of that shared effort to reach those metropolitan publics. Regardless, the relationship between those Filipino and British actors sheds some light on what Paul Kramer called in 2002 a “world of inter-imperial contacts, dialogues, and exchanges still largely underexplored by historians.”¹⁰⁴ Previous academics had demonstrated a shared culture between the U.S. and Great Britain existed.¹⁰⁵ Following their contributions, Kramer explored the disputed use of Anglo-Saxon racial exceptionalism by expansionists, British supporters, and anti-imperialists to argue both in favor or contrary to the Philippine Annexation.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁴ Kramer, “Empires, Exceptions, and Anglo-Saxons: Race and Rule between the British and U.S. Empires, 1880-1910,” 1353. Also Frank Schumacher, “The American War of Empire: National Tradition and Transatlantic Adaptation in America's Search for Imperial Identity, 1898-1910,” *GHI Bulletin* 31 (2002): 35–50.

¹⁰⁵ Stuart Anderson, *Race and Rapprochement: Anglo-Saxonism and Anglo-American Relations, 1895-1904* (Rutherford, N.J: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1981); Anna Maria Martellone, “In the Name of Anglo-Saxondon, for Empire and for Democracy: The Anglo-American Discourse, 1880-1920,” in *Reflections on American Exceptionalism*, 1994, 83–96; Ellery Sedgwick, *The Atlantic Monthly, 1857-1909: Yankee Humanitarianism at High Tide and Ebb* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1994); Daniel T Rodgers, *Atlantic Crossings* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1998).

¹⁰⁶ As examples of consequent literature about those inter-imperial contacts regarding the U.S. and Great Britain see Christopher Allen Morrison, “A World of Empires: United States Rule in the Philippines, 1898-1913” (Georgetown University, 2009); Thomas R. Metcalf, “From One Empire to Another: The Influence of the British Raj on American Colonialism in the Philippines,” *Ab Imperio* 3 (2012): 25–41; Kirkwood, “An ‘Administrative Race’? Anglo-Saxonism and Imperial Administrative Networks in Teh Philippines and Southern Africa, c. 1898-1921”; Patrick M. Kirkwood, “‘Lord Cromer’s Shadow’: Political Anglo-Saxonism and the Egyptian Protectorate as a Model in the American Philippines,” *Journal of World History* 27, no. 1 (2016): 1–26; Kristin Hoganson and Jay Sexton, *Crossing Empires: Taking U.S. History Into Transimperial Terrain* (Durham & London: Duke Univeristy Press, 2020).

Later, Jay Sexton and Ian Tyrrell defended the need to apply the same inter-imperial frame in tackling the opposition to Empire.¹⁰⁷ They warned that “since U.S. anti-imperialism existed within a wider framework of reactions to the spread of formal and informal empires, it is also worth asking what formal comparison can tell us.” Moreover, some “foreign actors sought to influence U.S. policy by a complex circulation of ideas that actually originated in the United States.” Just as the studied propagandists had done, “they deployed the language and symbols of American anti-imperialism for their own purposes against American conceptions of regional and global power.” Among them, they specifically pointed out that “the American anti-imperialists of the later nineteenth century lived in the world of the Anglo-American rapprochement in which reciprocal transatlantic reform influences were marked.”¹⁰⁸

The exposed case study picks up both claims demonstrating a significant collaboration between actors of the two political spectrums, British expansionists and Filipino revolutionaries aiming for Independence, that tried to shape the nature of the under-construction American empire in the Philippines.

Historiography about both British and American anti-imperialisms recognize the term comprises a wide variety of positions: most anti-imperialists did not contest the existence of the empire itself, but its way of expanding or functioning, and the same individuals supported both expansionist and anti-imperialists attitudes regarding different episodes or changed of positions along their life-lines.¹⁰⁹ Even accepting that

¹⁰⁷ Ian Tyrrell and Jay Sexton, *Empire's Twin: U.S. Anti-Imperialism from the Founding Era to the Age of Terrorism* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2015), 15.

¹⁰⁸ Tyrrell and Sexton, 15. Among the few works that had followed that line before Twin and Sexton's claim and for contributions made from that moment on, see: Steven C. Call, “Protesting Against Modern War: A Comparison of Issues Raised by Anti-Imperialists and Pro-Boers,” *War in History* 3, no. 1 (1996): 66–84; Erez Manela, “Imagining Woodrow Wilson in Asia: Dreams of East-West Harmony and the Revolt against Empire in 1919,” *The American Historical Review* 111, no. 5 (2006): 1327–1351; Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); Michael Patrick Cullinane, “Transatlantic Dimensions of the Anti-Imperialist Movement, 1899-1909,” *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 8, no. 4 (2010): 301–14; Cullinane, *Liberty and American Anti-Imperialism: 1898-1909*; Marc William Pallen, “Transimperial Roots of American Anti-Imperialism: The Transatlantic Radicalism of Free Trade, 1846-1920,” in *Crossing Empires: Taking U.S. History into Transimperial Terrain* (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2020).

¹⁰⁹ On British Anti-Imperialism: Bernard Porter, *Critics of Empire: British Radical Attitudes to Colonialism in Africa, 1895-1914* (London, 1968); Stephen Howe, *Anticolonialism in British Politics: The Left and the End of Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); Nicholas Owen, *The British Left and India: Metropolitan Anti-Imperialism 1885-1947* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); George Claeys, *Imperial Sceptics: British Critics of Empire, 1850-1920* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Mira Matikkala, *Empire and Imperial Ambition. Liberty, Englishness and Anti-Imperialism in Late Victorian Britain* (London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2011). On the diversity of

comprehensive definition, neither Duncan nor St. Clair could be considered critics of the British Empire. Instead, they praised its efforts in Asia, tried to contribute to them, and wanted the U.S. to imitate it. In addition, as the following chapter shows, the media where they worked criticized famous anti-imperialist characters related to the Second South-African War, like Emily Hobhouse or William T. Stead. What is more, some of them openly related their efforts to undermine the British imperial policy from its inside, what they considered despicable and unpatriotic, with those of the American Anti-Imperialists League.

Despite that, Duncan and St. Clair supported the Filipino propaganda efforts in a way U.S. anti-imperialists, who were trying to stop or at least limit the American expansion to the Philippines, failed to provide in those early stages of the conflict.¹¹⁰ As a matter of fact, their effort of spreading the message of colonized peoples in metropolitan public spheres to influence the nature of their Imperial relations is similar to the ones Priyamvada Gopal identified in her book *Insurgent Empire* as anti-imperial collaborations.¹¹¹ Consequently, their case points out the need to further explore the inter-imperial dialogues between expansionists and anti-imperialists and the connections both groups from different Empires established among them during shared fights.

American Anti-Imperialism see, among others: Berkeley E. Tompkins, *Anti-Imperialism in the United States: The Great Debate 1890-1920* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1970); Daniel B. Schirmer, *Republic or Empire: American Resistance to the Philippine War* (Cambridge, MA.: Schenkman, 1972); Robert Besnier, *Twelve Against Empire. The Anti-Imperialists 1898-1900* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1986); Cullinane, *Liberty and American Anti-Imperialism: 1898-1909*.

¹¹⁰ According to the available bibliography, and as the final chapter of this dissertation explores in-depth, collaboration between Filipinos and members of the Anti-imperialist League were very limited until 1902, in exceptional cases, 1900. See Jim Zwick, "The Anti-Imperialist League and the Origins of Filipino-American Oppositional Solidarity," *Amerasia Journal* 24 (1998): 64–85; Erin L. Murphy, *No Middle Ground: Anti-Imperialists and Ethical Witnessing during the Philippine-American War* (Maryland: Lexington Books, 2020).

¹¹¹ Priyamvada Gopal, *Insurgent Empire* (London, New York: Verso, 2019).

Conclusion

The examination of the English-language Pacific Press reveals an apparent influence from the Filipino Civilization Campaign. The analyzed newspapers accepted their arguments with very different enthusiasm, but all of them recognized the strength of the Philippine Republic. However, even their closest sympathizers never supported their total independence. Instead, they advocated for setting an American protectorate in the islands using the British example of colonialism.

Welcoming their arrival to the Pacific in the context of the Great Rapprochement, some of the studied British press tried to show “their American cousins” that it was the proper arrangement by working as loudspeakers of the Filipino propaganda. They praised the organization and effectiveness of the Philippine Republic for proving it deserved recognition as a legitimate interlocutor to design the future of the archipelago, even though it had to remain under strict American guidance.

After procrastinating during the whole war and even the Peace Negotiations, the U.S. failed to recognize them, and the examined journals adopted a highly critical attitude towards the American management of the situation. In particular, through the pages of the *Singapore Free Press*, William St. Clair participated and reproduced the attempts that Chesney Duncan and Howard Bray, press-representative and general adviser of the Filipino Junta, made to denounce the media misrepresentation of the Filipinos as savages and tried hard to correct those portraits. Considering how strong the argument about Filipino's supposed inability for self-government and their aggressive attitude towards the U.S. was for American expansionists, throwing the opposite views through the news channels was a genuinely revolutionary weapon. Therefore, the relation of these supporters of the uplifting mission of the Anglo-Saxon empires and Filipino revolutionaries emphasizes the need pointed out by influential historians to explore the inter-imperial dialogues that shaped their development.